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While there is a plethora of experimental studies on the
effects of preplay communication on economic behavior,
little is known about the impact of simple cues, such as
smiling, on pro-sociality. This article presents a compre-
hensive analysis exploring how the presence of a smiling
opportunity affects pro-social behavior as measured by a
one-shot linear public goods game. Our design varies
(i) whether smiling is costly or costless and (ii) whether
one or both members in a group are given the opportu-
nity to smile. To test for the robustness of our results, we
consider two versions of smiling cues: (i) a smiling label
and (ii) a smiling face (emoji). Our findings indicate that
introducing a cost for smiling has detrimental behavioral
consequences regardless of the cue. Specifically, when
smiling is costly, only a small minority of subjects are
willing to smile as opposed to when smiling is costless. As
a result, subjects contribute significantly less. These
results remain the same regardless of the type of smiling
cue that subjects can send. Overall, our findings provide
new evidence that simple cues such as smiles embody
information that influences pro-social behavior in social
interactions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Communication is an integral part of our everyday lives. It can take different forms (such as ver-
bal, visual, or nonverbal exchange of information) affecting our economic interactions and
cooperative relationships. By now, it is well-documented that preplay communication can be
used to achieve more socially desirable outcomes when personal gains and social benefits are at
odds (see Sally, 1995 and Balliet, 2009 for meta-analyses).1 However, the main focus of the liter-
ature is on the role of face-to-face and verbal communication. Numerous experimental studies
have found that such forms of communication can align individual incentives to social ones
(see Isaac and Walker, 1988; Brosig et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman, 2009;
Oprea et al., 2014; Feltovich and Grossman, 2015; and Palfrey et al., 2017).2 In parallel, a meta-
analysis by Sally (1995) finds that the only variable that accounts for differences in cooperation
and free-riding behavior is face-to-face communication.
While the effects of verbal communication on pro-social behavior have attracted consider-
able attention in the relevant literature, nonverbal forms of communication have been studied
less often.3 This lack of empirical evidence is surprising given the broad range of naturally-
occurring social environments, which are characterized by nonverbal communication. Typical
real-life examples include facial expressions, handshakes, clapping, and gestures, which involve
eye contact, winks, or gaze. Our study focuses on the effects of smiling on cooperation as mea-
sured by observing behavior in a one-shot linear public good game.
Smiling frequently occurs in social interactions between humans and plays a significant role
in our everyday transactions. For example, in many naturally occurring situations smiles may
serve as nonverbal surrogates used in order to enhance the exchange of social information. In
these situations, smiling is typically associated with positive connotations, which can act as a
cooperation device and lead to more socially efficient outcomes. As a result, the display of a smile
may operate as a mechanism that gives individuals the opportunity to signal their intentions for
subsequent behavior. A more specific motivation for analyzing the effects of smiling on economic
behavior stems from existing psychological literature, which suggests that the display of positive
emotions through smiling can serve as a signal of positive experience (e.g., Ekman and
Friesen, 1982; Frank and Ekman, 1993). These studies show that smiles (as transmitted via the
use of emojis) correlate with generating positive feelings (e.g., Hess et al., 1995).4 Overall, these
1A different line of research has also recognized the positive impact of communication in overcoming coordination
failures (e.g., Cason et al., 2012; Charness, 2000; Crawford, 1998; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002, 2006).
2However, recent evidence suggests that the pro-cooperative effect of communication may be mitigated by the use of a
limited message space (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Cooper & Kühn 2016).
3By contrast, the effects of non-verbal communication have attracted relatively more attention in psychology research
(see DePaulo & Friedman, 1997 and Riggio & Feldman, 2005 for overviews).
4There is a separate line of research showing that positive (negative) feelings are associated with economic behavior
(e.g., Cubitt et al., 2011; Joffily et al., 2014).
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findings suggest that smiles affect the way in which people behave positively. Our study provides
a comprehensive analysis of how smiling interacts with pro-social behavior by considering two
types of smiling cues: (i) a smiling (emoji) face and (ii) a smiling label. The rationale for consider-
ing a smiling face is that it reflects modern digital communication commonly employed in natu-
rally occurring environments. On the other hand, we also consider a smiling label, which allows
us to study nonverbal communication, free from confounding factors that are likely to interact
with the use of smiling faces. Our design thus provides a tight test of the extent to which smiling
can affect pro-social behavior in a mixed motive environment.
To analyze pro-social behavior, we turn to the analysis of a standard social dilemma game
where members of a group share the benefits of a common resource but each has to decide indi-
vidually how much to contribute to its provision. Contribution is costly to the contributor but
helps all other group members.5 Prior to playing the game, our subjects are given the opportu-
nity to report their current state by selecting one of two options labeled as “smiling state” or
“ready state.” For a given type of smiling cue, we vary whether smiling is costless or costly.
Additionally, we examine whether allowing one or both members in a group to utilize smiling
labels affects behavior. Previous studies have shown that one-way communication leads to more
frequent choices of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in simple coordination games
(e.g., Cooper et al., 1992) and higher contributions in social dilemma games (e.g., Koukoumelis
et al., 2012). Yet, how one-way versus two-way communication utilizing smiling cues that are
distinct from face-to-face/verbal communication influences behavior in a social dilemma game
remains unclear.
Our findings indicate that smiling cues embody information that affects aspects of pro-social
behavior. In particular, we find that introducing a cost for the use of smiling labels has detri-
mental effects on cooperative behavior in the sense that individuals become significantly less
pro-social compared to the case when sending a smiling cue is free. This finding holds regard-
less of which smiling type we consider. Our results are driven by the fact that the frequency of
smiling labels is significantly lower when such labels are costly compared to when they are cost-
less. Our findings indicate that individuals attach significant negative informational value when
smiling cues are available but not used.
Our results broaden the existing literature on communication in public good games. Specifically,
we provide evidence using a large sample (n = 454) that costless smiling cues do not increase coop-
eration in a public good game with low cooperation benefits compared to when such communica-
tion is not possible. From a more practical perspective, one reason why costless smiling cues are
equally effective compared to when such communication is not present is that subjects may per-
ceive them as being an ambiguous and less explicit means of communication. Our results are also
suggestive that, at least in one-shot interactions, less explicit forms of communication (as nonverbal
is relative to face-to-face) may need to be accompanied with more explicit elements of communica-
tion (such as face-to-face interactions) which have been shown to foster pro-sociality (e.g., Bochet
et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman, 2009). Experimental evidence (for a review, see Wang and
Houser, 2019) shows that the presence of natural language communication has a positive impact
on efficiency in various economic games. Relying on this evidence, it may be the case that, in our
context, the limiting effects of smiling on pro-social behavior are due to the lack of a richer commu-
nication environment (e.g., allowing subjects to send free-form messages) which typically facilitates
cooperation. Additionally, it might be the case that the benefits from cooperation in our setting are
5This paradigm has been typically employed in experimental economics to understand pro-social behavior (e.g.,
Andreoni, 1988; Brandts & Schram, 2001; Coats et al., 2009; Ostrom & Vollan, 2010).
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low and this may be a factor for the lack of significant differences between the costless and the no-
communication treatments. Yet, when a cost of smiling is introduced, subjects refrain from using
them and, importantly, we also observe that average contribution levels are lower. Future research
is warranted to explore how smiling cues work in a mixed motive environment where the benefits
from cooperation are higher.
Our article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental design and proce-
dures. Our experimental findings are presented in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 | EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
2.1 | Experimental design
Our experiment employs a between subject design, considering nine treatments. The main frame-
work we employ is that of a standard two-player linear public goods game. In particular, subjects
play a one-stage game where they randomly form groups of two members. Each group member is
endowed with 20 tokens and has to decide how many of them to keep and how many to contribute
to the public good (described as a “project” to subjects). Each token kept increases the own mone-
tary payoff by one experimental currency unit (ECU). Each token contributed to the public good
increases the payoff of every group member by 0.6 ECUs. Our choice to implement a low multipli-
cation factor is that we wanted to adopt a more conservative approach where the temptation from
reaping the benefits from free-riding were relatively strong. This would offer a more stringent test
for the role of smiling in promoting cooperative behavior. For a given group member, the payoff
function from this game is given by the following equation.
πi =20−gi + 0:6  gi + gj
 
ð1Þ
where gi (0 ≤ gi ≤ 20) denotes the number of tokens contributed to the public good by group
member i. Conditional on each subject i being motivated to maximize Equation (1), the Nash
equilibrium requires that each group member free-rides completely (i.e. contributes zero to the
public good, gi = 0).
To address our main research questions, subjects were given the opportunity to report a
state before playing the game in all treatments (except for the baseline). In particular, subjects
were provided with two options: either to report a “Ready” state or a “Smiling” state. We ana-
lyze behavior in the following treatments, which differ in relation to i) whether the smiling
state is costless or costly, ii) whether one or both of the two members in a group were given the
opportunity to report their state, and iii) whether subjects could report their state using a smil-
ing label or a smiling face. In the costly treatments, subjects who reported the “Smiling” state
had to pay 0.5 ECUs, whereas reporting the “Ready” state was always costless (regardless of the
treatments). The reporting of states was done choosing buttons labeled “smiling” and “ready”
that either showed emojis above them or not. Our baseline treatments had subjects participate
in the standard linear public goods game as described above, without subjects being given the
opportunity to report their state.
The introduction of a cost for the smiling label may increase the credibility of such cues
and, as a result, may signal stronger willingness to cooperate compared to costless smiling cues,
which may be perceived as being pure cheap talk. Alternatively, introducing a price for the
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smiling labels may act as a discouraging factor for individuals to use such labels, which may in
turn have negative implications for cooperative behavior. It is therefore of interest to assess
which of these two forces will dominate when it comes to actual decision making.
We refer to the resulting treatments in which subjects could report their state as follows:
(a) “Costless—One way” whereby the smiling cue is costless and one of the two group members
(randomly selected) reports his/her state, (b) “Costless—Two way” whereby the smiling cue is
costless and both group members report their states, (c) “Costly—One way” whereby the smil-
ing cue is costly and one of the two group members (randomly selected) reports his/her state,
and (d) “Costly—Two way” whereby the smiling cue is costly and both group members report
their states.
In the “Two way” treatments, where both group members are given the opportunity to
report their state (either “Smiling” or “Ready”), reporting is done sequentially, with one group
member being randomly selected to go first. The reported state is revealed to the second mem-
ber, prior to their own report. The reason for adopting a sequential structure was to avoid fre-
quent occurrences of mixed states being sent. Our decision to adopt a sequential design for
reporting states was motivated by a study due to Manzini et al. (2009), who find that report of
mixed states occurs more frequently in a simultaneous structure compared to a sequential one.
Figure 1 reproduces the subjects' interface from the “Two way” treatments showing how
our reporting of states took place. The top panel shows the interface when a smiling label was
used; whereas the bottom panel shows the interface when a smiling face (emoji) was used. Spe-
cifically, subjects were asked to indicate what their current state is by selecting one of the two
buttons containing either the word “Smiling” or “Ready.” Note that subjects had to make an
actual choice and no default option was provided.
2.2 | Procedures
In total, 454 subjects participated in the experiment. Table 1 presents an overview of our treat-
ments, along with a breakdown of the number of subjects who participated in each treatment
separately.
All subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using the ORSEE software
(Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was computerized and programmed with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each session, subjects were privately paid according to
their total amount of experimental currency units (ECUs), using an exchange rate of £0.40 per
ECU. Average earnings (including a show-up fee of £2.50) were £10.91. Sessions lasted 60 min,
on average. Before subjects played the game, they received the instructions reproduced in
supporting information Appendix A. As we wanted to ensure that subjects understood the deci-
sion situation and the mechanics of payoff calculations, all participants answered several con-
trol questions. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had answered these
questions correctly.
3 | RESULTS
In presenting our data analysis, we first discuss whether and if so, under which conditions sub-
jects are willing to report a smiling state. Following this, we explore the impact of smiling states
on pro-social behavior across our treatments.
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(i) Smiling label
(ii) Smiling face (emoji)
FIGURE 1 Subjects' interface in the “two way” treatments. (i) Smiling label. (ii) Smiling face (emoji) [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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3.1 | Frequency of smiling states
Result 1: Subjects report a smiling state significantly more when smiling is costless compared to
when it is costly. This is the case regardless of the type of smiling cue (either a smiling label or a
smiling face).
Support: Table 2 reports the number of subjects who decided to report a smiling state. As a
first observation, we see that the type of smiling cue does not affect the decision of subjects for
whether to report a smiling state or not. Overall, 79 out of 144 subjects (54.86%) reported a smil-
ing state in the treatments with a smiling label and 93 out of 160 (58.13%) subjects reported a
smiling state in the treatments with a smiling face.6
However, there is a remarkable difference in how often subjects report a smiling state
depending on whether this is costly or not. In the costless treatments, we find that the over-
whelming majority of subjects (i.e., 81.82%, 126/154) report a smiling signal (Test of equality of
proportions, z = 9.27, p <.001). This pattern is reversed when reporting states become costly.
Only a minority of subjects (i.e., 30.67%, 46/150) are prepared to pay and report a costly state.
Table 3 reports the frequencies of subjects who report a state for each possible signal con-
stellation. Specifically, we include four categories: “ready-ready,” “smile-smile,” “ready-smile,”
and “smile-ready.” In each of the four signal constellations, the first state refers to the first
TABLE 1 Overview of the experimental design
Report of states Treatments Smiling label Smiling face (emoji)
No Baseline 46
Costless One way 50 50
Two way 48 56
Costly One way 54 54
Two way 44 52
TABLE 2 Number of subjects reporting a smiling state across treatments
Report of states Treatment Smiling label Smiling face (emojis)
No Baseline — —
Costless One way 0.76 (19/25) 0.80 (20/25) 0.82 (126/154)
Two way 0.79 (38/48) 0.88 (49/56)
Costly One way 0.41 (11/27) 0.22 (6/27) 0.31 (46/150)
Two way 0.25 (11/44) 0.35 (18/52)
0.55 (79/144) 0.58 (93/160)
Note: The significance of italic value is Test of Equality of proportions, z = 0.60, p = 0.549.
6The specific test statistic is Z = (p1 − p2)/Spc, where pi is the proportion of reported smiles in subsample i, and
Spc = {pc(1 − pc)[(1/N1) + (1/N2)]} 0̂.5. pc is an estimate of the standard error of the difference in proportions, p1 − p2. pc
is an estimate of the population proportion under the null hypothesis of equal proportions, pc = (p1N1 + p2N2)/
(N1 + N2), where Ni is the total number of interactions in subsample i (see Glasnapp & Poggio, 1985).
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mover and the second state refers to the second mover. For the “One way” treatments we report
the frequencies of the smiling and ready states of the randomly selected subject who was given
the opportunity to report his/her state.
We first examine how frequently mixed versus nonmixed states were reported in the “Two-
way” treatments. We observe that, both in the “Costless” and “Costly” treatments, most pairs
report mixed states compared to nonmixed states. Specifically, in the treatments where a smil-
ing label was allowed to be sent, 16 out of 24 pairs (66.67%) and 13 out of 22 pairs (59.09%) sent
a nonmixed state in the “Costless” and the “Costly” treatments, respectively. We obtain a simi-
lar pattern when considering the treatments where a smiling face was allowed to be sent:
23 out of 28 pairs (82.14%) and 20 out of 26 pairs (76.92%) sent a nonmixed state in the “Cost-
less” and the “Costly” treatments, respectively. This provides evidence that, while the occur-
rence of mixed states was not possible to be eliminated completely, our sequential structure of
state reporting kept them at relatively lower frequencies.
Next, we look at the frequencies of state constellations: the general observation is that most
pairs choose to report the same signals (that is, either “ready-ready” or “smile-smile”), but the
content of the signals (i.e., either the “smiling” or the “ready” state) differs depending on
whether the smiling state is costly or costless. This is the case for the “Two way” as well as the
“One way” treatments. Specifically, regardless of the type of smiling cue, in the “Two way”
treatments we observe that the frequency of the “ready-ready” pairs is much higher in the treat-
ments where smiles are costly (12 out of 22 pairs and 14 out of 26 pairs in the “smiling label”
and the “smiling face” treatments, respectively) compared to when smiles are costless (1 out of
24 pairs and 1 out of 28 pairs in the “smiling label” and the “smiling face” treatments, respec-
tively). The opposite pattern is obtained for the frequency of the “smile-smile” pairs. Such a
state constellation is observed in only 1 out of 22 pairs and 6 out of 26 pairs in the “smiling
label” and the “smiling face” treatments, respectively, when smiling signals are costly. By con-
trast, in the treatments where smiling states are costless, a “smile-smile” constellation is
observed in 15 out of 24 pairs and 22 out of 28 pairs in the “smiling label” and the “smiling
face” treatments, respectively.
In the “One way” treatments, we also observe a similar trend: which signal to report
depends on whether the smiling state is costly or costless but not on the type of smiling cue.
For the “Costly” treatments, 16 out of 27 pairs and 21 out of 27 pairs in the “smiling label” and
the “smiling face” treatments, respectively, choose to report a “ready” state. This is reversed in
the treatments where the smiling state is costless. Most pairs, in these cases, report a “smile-
smile” state: 19 out of 25 pairs and 20 out of 25 pairs in the “smiling label” and the “smiling
face” treatments, respectively. Taken together, the main message from our analysis is that even
small communication costs dramatically reduce message use, which is in line with recent exper-
imental studies on communication (e.g., Blume et al., 2017; Fehr, 2017).
In presenting the consequences of smiling cues on economic behavior across our treat-
ments, we next concentrate on subjects' contribution behavior in the linear public good game.
3.2 | Contribution behavior
Result 2: (a) When smiling is costless, average contributions are not significantly different com-
pared to the baseline treatment. (b) When smiling is costless, average contributions are significantly
lower compared to when smiling is costly.
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These results hold regardless of the type of smiling cue (either a smiling label or a smil-
ing face).
Support: Table 4 reports the average contributions in each treatment separately, when a
smiling label or a smiling face is available. As indicated in the last column of Table 4, by per-
forming a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we find that there are no differences in contribution behav-
ior when we compare behavior in a given treatment across the two different types of smiling
cues (“smiling label” versus “smiling face”).
By contrast, we find that, relative to the baseline treatment, subjects, on average, contribute
similar amounts of tokens in the costless treatments either when a smiling label (“Baseline”
vs. “Costless—Two way,” p = .843, and “Baseline” vs. “Costless—One way,” p = .242) or a smil-
ing face is available (“Baseline” vs. “Costless—Two way,” p = .122) and “Baseline”
vs. “Costless—One way,” p = .254).7 Turning to the costly treatments, average contributions are
significantly lower in both costly treatments irrespective of whether both group members or
one of the two members in a group report their states. In particular, this is observed in the smil-
ing label treatments (“Baseline” vs. “Costly—Two way,” p = .049) and “Baseline” vs. “Costly—
One way,” p = .024) but also in the smiling face treatments (“Baseline” vs. “Costly—Two way,”
p = .035) and “Baseline” vs. “Costly—One way,” p = .008).8
When we pool the “One way” and the “Two way” data for each, the “Costless” and the
“Costly” treatments, we find that average contributions are significantly lower in the latter com-
pared to the former treatments in the smiling label treatments (6.22 tokens in the “Costless”
treatments vs. 4.52 in the “Costly” treatments; p = .063). Similarly, we also find that average
contributions are significantly lower in the pooled “Costly” treatments compared to the pooled
“Costless” treatments in the smiling face treatments (5.58 tokens in the “Costless” treatments
vs. 4.83 in the “Costly” treatments; p = .068). Taken together, our data show that the presence
of a cost in reporting the smiling state discourages subjects to use this option and, as a result,
subjects become less pro-social relative to the baseline treatment as well as to the treatments
where there is no cost in reporting a smiling state. Our findings are robust to the type of smiling
cues that subjects can use (either a smiling label or a smiling face).




in the smiling label
treatment
Average contributions





No Baseline 6.72 (5.24) —
Costless One way 5.66 (5.90) 5.84 (6.01) .978
Two way 6.81 (6.10) 5.34 (5.50) .214
Costly One way 4.50 (4.94) 4.26 (5.41) .560
Two way 4.55 (4.57) 5.42 (7.40) .530
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
aTwo-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
7The comparison of the costless treatments (“Costless—Two way” vs. “Costless—One way”) yields no significant
differences either when a smiling label (p = .301) or a smiling face is available (p = .799).
8The comparison of the costly treatments (“Costly—Two way” vs. “Costly—One way”) yields no significant differences
either when a smiling label (p = .832) or a smiling face is available (p = .995).
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As our final step, we analyze the effectiveness of each signal separately across treatments.
To do this, we look at average contributions in each possible state constellation. However, we
note that in the costly (costless) treatments, the number of observations we have for the smiling
(ready) state is particularly low and we therefore treat such analysis cautiously, only referring
to eyeballing remarks (as performing nonparametric test would be meaningless given the low
number of observations in the relevant cells). Table 5 reports the average contributions in each
state constellation per treatment. Two observations stand out from our analysis in Table 5. First,
looking at each state constellation per treatment, we find that when smiles are costless, average
contributions are typically higher compared to when smiles are costly. This is also the case
where subjects can send a smiling face rather than a more abstract smiling label. For instance,
when smiling is expensive, those subjects who decide to send a costly smiling face contribute,
on average, 8.25 and 5.33 in the “Two way” and the “One way” treatments, respectively. This
suggests that expensive (even if it is nonbinding) talk, like our costly smiling face, is generally
more effective.
Second, we find that when both signals are costless, the use of the costless smiles does not
have positive effects on cooperation relative to the costless ready signals. Again, this is more
apparent in the smiling face treatments. For example, both in the “Two way” and “One way”
treatments, costless smiles yield lower contributions than costless ready signals (“Two way”: 5.5
vs. 6; “One way”: 5.68 vs. 6.5, respectively). Concerning the smiling labels, the picture is mixed:
we observe that costless smiles yield lower contributions in the “One way” treatments but not
in the “Two way” treatments. Overall, these remarks suggest that costless smiles may be used
as a strategic device in an attempt to entice the other group member to contribute without nec-
essarily meaning that the signaller would contribute. As a result of this mutual cheap talk, aver-
age contributions appear to be lower.
4 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we explore the role simple cues, such as smiling, play as a mechanism that deter-
mines aspects of individuals' pro-social behavior. Our workhorse is a standard two-player linear
public goods game, which captures many naturally occurring situations where a tension
between personal benefits and social gains emerges. Our experiment analyses how smiling, as a
form of nonverbal preplay communication, impacts cooperative behavior in a setting where
benefits from cooperation are low. To study these issues, our design varies (i) whether smiling
is costly or costless and (ii) whether one or both group members are given the opportunity to
communicate abstractly. To test for the robustness of behavior, we employ two types of smiling
cues: a smiling label and a smiling face (emojis).
Our findings indicate that the cost of smiling is a crucial factor that influences the extent of
cooperative behavior. In particular, introducing a cost for smiles makes subjects less willing to
use them as an information channel in order to signal their intentions about subsequent behav-
ior. As a result, the lack of using smiles has negative consequences on pro-social behavior: sub-
jects contribute significantly less when smiles are costly. The type of smiling cue makes no
difference with regards to the frequency of smiles and subsequent cooperative behavior.
Our experiment is related to previous social dilemma studies on cheap-talk. For example, in
Wilson and Sell (1997) and Bochet et al. (2006), subjects are asked to indicate a nonbinding
number of how much they would like to contribute to the common resource (prior to playing a
standard public good game). Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) allowed subjects to make a costless



























































































































































































































































































































































































SMILING CUES & COOPERATION 1401
single announcement on whether they intended to contribute or not in a step level public good
game. A common finding from these studies is that subjects did not obtain more efficient out-
comes in the presence of cheap talk preplay communication opportunities. Our experiment
contributes to the cheap-talk communication literature by showing that the availability of
costly labels that are ultimately not used can have detrimental behavioral consequences in a
public good environment where cooperation benefits are low. The effectiveness of smiling
cues is limited so that average contributions are similar compared to when no smiling cues
are present. This implies that smiling cues are a minimal form of communication which do
not harm when they are costless but are harmful when costly. Overall, our findings suggest
that in order to enhance pro-sociality, smiling cues may be necessary to be accompanied
with other elements of the decision making environment such as higher benefits from coop-
eration in order for them to be able to reduce the temptation from free-riding benefits and
yield higher cooperation levels.
In line with previous findings that numerical cheap talk does not increase contributions
(e.g., Bochet and Putterman, 2009), we find that “smiling cue” cheap talk yields similar cooper-
ation levels as interactions in which no communication is allowed. Consonant with past experi-
mental evidence (e.g., Wang and Houser, 2019 and references therein), our findings show that
when preplay communication does not include natural language, its positive effects in improv-
ing efficiency of economic outcomes are limited. Interestingly, subjects seem to attach signifi-
cant negative informational value to the absence of simple cues, such as smiles, when they are
costly. Introducing a price for smiling discourages its use, which in turn triggers negative behav-
ioral consequences in establishing less socially efficient outcomes.
Our study gives rise to a number of different future research avenues. First, examining the
temporal stability and robustness over time of our findings is of great importance to gain a
deeper understanding of how smiling interplays with pro-sociality when reputation gains are
present. It would be interesting to evaluate whether subjects would be more willing to use
costly smiles when the game is repeated as it might be that paying to smile may have greater
benefits in the long-run (as found by Manzini et al., 2009, for coordination games). Second, fur-
ther research is warranted to investigate the robustness of our results when the benefits from
cooperation are higher than in our public good setting. It might be the case that smiling works
better as a communication device when individuals' benefits from mutual cooperation are
greater. Finally, how simple cues, such as smiling, affects other aspects of pro-social behavior
remains an open empirical question which will help establish further the behavioral mecha-
nisms through which observed behavior is affected.
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